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COMMENT
"AS WE SEE IT"-THE NLRB AND THE COURTS
ACCOMMODATE UNION SOLICITATION RIGHTS AND
HOSPITAL PATIENT-CARE RESPONSIBILXIIES: BETH
ISRAEL HOSPITAL V. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
BOARD
The general rule governing an employer's ability to curtail its
employees' activities in union solicitation on nonworking time in
nonworking areas has been settled for over thiry years:' any restric-
tion on such activity is presumptively invalid as a violation of rights
guaranteed by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). 2 It is
recognized universally that the primary concern of a hospital is to
provide the best possible care for its patients. Conflict occurs, how-
ever, when the employer-hospital feels it must restrict employees'
rights in order to further the hospital's own patient-care responsibil-
ities. This conflict presents a classic accommodation problem that
must be resolved in many labor-relations disputes: employer rights
and responsibilities must be balanced against employee privileges
and duties. Conceivably, the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB), each federal court of appeals, and the United States Su-
preme Court could all strike this balance between employer and
employee differently.
A solution to this accommodation problem in the health-care field
1. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945), is the seminal case deciding this
issue.
2. Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 491-92 (1978) (citing Republic Aviation, 324
U.S. at 798, as articulating a broad legal principle encompassed by § 7 of the NLRA).
The Wagner Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended by the Taft-Hartley Act, 61 Stat. 136
(1947), 65 Stat. 601 (1951), 72 Stat. 945 (1958), and the Landrum-Griffin Act, 73 Stat. 541
(1959), constitute the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1970).
Section 7 of the NLRA concerns the general rights of all employees and is the basis for the
unfair labor practice charges that are defined specifically by § 8(a) of the Act. Section 7
states:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choos-
ing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to
refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may
be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a
condition of employment as authorized in section 158(a)(3).
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
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had not been developed because, until the 1974 amendments,3 non-
profit hospitals were not covered by the NLRA, and the Board had
not decided the issue conclusively with respect to hospifals for
profit. The opportunity came, however, with Beth Israel Hospital v.
The National Labor Relations Board;4 the administrative law judge,
the panel of three board members, the panel of three judges for the
First Circuit Court of Appeals, and five Supreme Court Justices,
with the other four Justices concurring, 5 all decided that the no-
solicitation rule, as it applied to the hospital's cafeteria,8 was an
unlawful infringement of rights guaranteed to workers by the
NLRA.1 The Supreme Court concluded that "based on its experi-
ence in enforcing the Act, the Board developed legal rules applying
the principle of accommodation"8 and applied them correctly in this
case.' Such unified rulings would seem to support two propositions:
first, the most rational accommodation had been found; and, sec-
ond, Beth Israel would provide an employer-hospital with useful
guidelines to establish solicitation rules. Due to the myriad of pecu-
liar fact patterns, however, such assumptions are not justified. Beth
.Israel rested upon a set of circumstances so unique as to be useless,
at best, or misleading, at worst, should a more typical hospital-
solicitation case arise for adjudication.
In the cafeteria of Beth Israel Hospital a medical technician in the
Department of Medicine was distributing the union newsletter enti-
tled "As We See It" to employees of the hospital."0 This type of
3. Coverage was achieved by deleting from the definition of employer, in § 2(2) of the Act,
the provision that an employer shall not include "any corporation or association operating a
hospital, if no part of the net earnings inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or
individual." 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (Supp. V 1975).
4. For the complete prior history of this case, see 223 N.L.R.B. 1193 (1976); 554 F.2d 477
(1st Cir. 1977).
5. The decisional history is as follows: the Administrative Law Judge-Ivar H. Peterson;
the panel of three Board Members-Chairman Murphy, Members Fanning and Jenkins; the
panel of three Court of Appeals Judges for the First Circuit-Chief Judge Coffin, Circuit
Judge Campbell, and District Judge Bownes (of the District of New Hampshire, sitting by
designation); and the five Supreme Court Justices-Justice Brennan (author of the opinion),
Justices Stewart, White, Marshall, and Stevens (Justices Blackmun and Powell each filed
concurring opinions; Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist joined in both concurring
opinions).
6. For a discussion of the "area limitation" in the Court's holding, see note 52 infra &
accompanying text.
7. 437 U.S. at 507.
8. Id. at 492.
9. Id. at 501.
10. Id. at 491.
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situation is found in the usual solicitation case. Upon further exami-
nation, however, the facts of Beth Israel quickly become atypical.
What these facts are, how the courts dealt with them, and the
possible consequence of such a decision in the health-care field will
be the focus of this Comment after the case's background has been
set forth.
SOLICITATION-DISTRIBUTION PRECEDENT
The Boundaries Outside The Health-Care Field
Both solicitation and distribution issues" were presented to the
Board within the same year and were resolved in two seminal cases.
In Peyton Packing Co.,' 2 the Board articulated its solicitation rule
for the first time: during work time, an employee could be prohib-
ited from solicitation by his employer, absent an antiunion motive,
because "working time is for work"; 3 but during nonworking time,
solicitation must be allowed, even if on company property."' Federal
labor policy recognizes that union organization can be effective only
if employees are given the opportunity to discuss freely among their
peers the advantages and disadvantages of unionization in an unin-
hibiting and convenient environment. In implementing this policy
in Peyton Packing, the Board emphasized the time element as the
focal point of the case; working and nonworking hours were distin-
guished.
This line of reasoning was reaffirmed in Republic Aviation.5 Long
11. Though these terms are often used interchangeably, or one term is used for both
activities, solicitation and distribution are technically distinct; solicitation involves oral con-
tact, whereas distribution is associated with the handing out of printed material. In most
instances these activities occur simultaneously. This distinction is discussed further with
reference to Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 615 (1962). See note 42 infra & accompa-
nying text.
12. 49 N.L.R.B. 828 (1943). Subsequently, the Fifth Circuit enforced the Board's order. 142
F.2d 1009 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 730 (1944).
13. 49 N.L.R.B. at 843.
14. Id. at 843-44. The Board allowed a different presumption with each time frame. A no-
solicitation rule covering working hours "must be presumed to be valid in the absence of
evidence that it was adopted for a discriminatory purpose;" whereas a no-solicitation rule
covering nonworking hours "must be presumed to be an unreasonable impediment to self-
organization and therefore discriminatory in the absence of evidence that special circumstan-
ces make the rule necessary in order to maintain production or discipline." Id.
15. 324 U.S. 793 (1945). Although Peyton Packing was decided first, Republic Aviation is
the case most often cited for the Board's basic position, before refinements, concerning the
solicitation doctrine.
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before any union activity among employees took place, Republic, a
manufacturer of military aircraft, had a broad but simple policy:
"[s]oliciting of any type cannot be permitted in the factory or
offices."'" The activities that resulted in the unfair labor practice
complaint 7 were the handing out of membership application cards
by a union organizer on his lunch hour'" and the wearing of union
steward buttons by workers.'" The company dismissed the employ-
ees for this union activity. The employer argued that its solicitation
rule was long-standing and had been followed consistently; further-
more, with respect to the display of union buttons, permitting such
behavior at the plant would indicate company support for the par-
ticular union in violation of the NLRA. 0 Although the NLRB had
found no antiunion animus, it ruled that employee solicitation
rights must prevail, and the Supreme Court agreed with the Board's
rationale. 2'
The second seminal case demonstrating the Board's interpreta-
16. Id. at 795.
17. Solicitation and distribution cases involve § 8(a)(i) and, usually, § 8(a)(3) violations if
disciplinary action was taken. All of § 8 deals with unfair labor practices. Subsection (a)
defines violations of employers. These provisions state:
Section 8. (a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 157;
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term
or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization.
29 U.S.C. 44 158(a)(1), (3) (1970).
18. 324 U.S. at 795. The Board considers such card activity as solicitation. See also
Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 615 (1962).
The significance of autliorization cards to union organizational activity is that a duty for
the employer to recognize the union for collective bargaining purposes can arise, notwith-
standing the fact that no election has been held, if the union can demonstrate a majority of
the employees support the union evidenced by these signature cards. Such a procedure is
referred to as "having a card majority." See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
19. 324 U.S. at 795.
20. Id. Employers have been found guilty of a § 8(a)(2) violation for supporting union
organization. Section 8(a)(2) states that it shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer
"to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization or
contribute financial or other support to it." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1970) (emphasis supplied);
see, e.g., Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956) (outside or international union);
NLRB v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469 (1941) ("company or local union). Allowing
employees to wear union buttons, however, does not constitute "support." Republic Aviation
Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. at 802 n.7.
21. 324 U.S. at 803-04. For a more recent case supporting this holding, see D'Youville
Manor v. NLRB, 526 F.2d 3 (1st Cir. 1975).
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tion of permissible union organizational acitivity under the NLRA
is Le Tourneau Co. of Georgia.2 The focal point of this decision was
the place of the activity. Two employees were dismissed for distrib-
uting union circulars in the company parking lot in violation of the
employer's no-distribution rule.2s Although the company justified
its rule by stating that it was "to control littering and petty pilfering
from parked autos by distributors, '24 and although the Board also
found that there was no union bias or discrimination in the rule's
enforcement,2 5 the Board held that the employer's policy violated
the NLRA.2 1
In so ruling, the Board analyzed the geographic area. Le Tourneau
was a manufacturer of earth-moving machinery and was located on
6,000 acres in a rural area. The plant was bounded by two public
highways and was enclosed by a high fence. If outdoor distribution
did not occur in the parking lot, automobiles and buses would have
to be stopped on their approach to the plant, while still on public
roads, for employees to receive the union communications. 27 Given
these physical circumstances, employer interests had to accommo-
date employee solicitation rights.2 1
22. 54 N.L.R.B. 1253 (1943). The court of appeals denied enforcement of the Board's order
striking down the employer's no-solicitation rule, 143 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1944), but the Supreme
Court reversed the lower court and upheld the Board in the companion case of Republic
Aviation, 324 U.S. at 801-02.
23. 324 U.S. at 796. The rule in Le Tourneau was less vague than the one in Republic
Aviation and, on its face, appeared neutral as a possibility of company permission was
included:
[N]o Merchants, Concern, Company or Individual or Individuals will be per-
mitted to distribute, post or otherwise circulate handbills or posters or any
literature of any description on Company property without first securing permis-
sion from the Personnel Department.
Id. at 796-97. This rule also failed to meet Board requirements for adequate employee-
organizational protection, however. Id.
24. Id. at 797.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 803.
27. Id. at 797. It was further noted that the homes of the workers were widely scattered.
Id.
28. Further cases developed over time involving the relation of the area to the solicitation
right. E.g., NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956) (an employer may prohibit
distribution of literature on his property when other channels of communication will enable
the union to reach the employee without unreasonable efforts as long as the rule is not applied
with discrimination); Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539 (1972) (solicitation in
a company parking lot although located in an urban area and "open to the public" must be
considered in light of Babcock); NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322 (1974) (limiting
solicitation to notices on a union bulletin board, even if agreed to by the union in a collective
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Furthermore, another factor, that of the status of the distributor,
must be considered in addition to the variables of time and place.
In Babcock & Wilcox, 29 the company's parking lot was the scene of
the union's activity; however, the union organizers were not em-
ployed at the manufacturing company but were "outsiders." The
Board ruled that the company must allow the activity. 0 The Fifth
Circuit denied enforcement of the Board's order, holding that it
would not impose a servitude on the employer's property when no
employee was involved.3' The Supreme Court granted certiorari be-
cause the Board was applying the rule of Le Tourneau consistently,
whether the individuals involved were employees or nonemployees,
and because the circuits were split on their enforcements of these
orders.32
The Supreme Court stated that accommodation between organi-
zational rights and property rights "must be obtained with as little
destruction of one as is consistent with the maintenance of the
other. The employer may not affirmatively interfere with organiza-
tion; the union may not always insist that the employer aid organi-
zation." The Court, in refining the Board's analysis, reversed the
Board's decision and affirmed the court of appeals. The Court's
holding was based on the nonemployee status of the organizers and
the alternate channels of communication available to them.34 The
opinion noted that the distinction between employee and nonem-
ployee status was one of substance and that nonemployee access to
company property was governed by a different standard.35
After these four cases were decided-Peyton Packing,'3 Republic
bargaining contract, may be a violation of § 7 rights which cannot be waived.
For additional recent cases discussing the significance of the distinction between nonwork
and working areas in general, see Food Store Employees Local 347 v. NLRB, 418 F.2d 1177
(D.C. Cir. 1969); International Ass'n. of Mach. & Aerospace Workers Dist. 9 v. NLRB, 415
F.2d 113 (8th Cir. 1969); NLRB v. Orleans Mfg. Co., 412 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1969); Winchester
Spinning Corp. v. NLRB, 402 F.2d 299 (4th Cir. 1968).
29. 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
30. 109 N.L.R.B. 485, 486 (1954).
31. 222 F.2d 316, 318-19 (5th Cir. 1955).
32. The circuit denying enforcement, as had the Fifth Circuit in Babcock, was the Tenth
Circuit in NLRB v. Seamprufe, Inc., 222 F.2d 858 (10th Cir. 1955); the circuit granting
enforcement was the Sixth Circuit in NLRB v. Ranco, Inc., 222 F.2d 543 (6th Cir. 1955).
33. 351 U.S. at 112.
34. Id. at 113-14. Those means that were suggested included use of the mail, telephone,
and home visits. Id. at 107.
35. Id. at 113 (dictum).
36. 142 F.2d 1009 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 730 (1944).
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Aviation,3" Le Tourneau,38 and Babcock & Wilcox 3-the basic ap-
proaches of the Board to solicitation-distribution issues were estab-
lished. Further cases only refined these general rules in different
circumstances deemed significant. One such circumstance was the
nature of the employer's business. Two types of businesses provide
contrasts to the initial, basic line of cases in which the courts dealt
primarily with manufacturing concerns. The first is the situation of
the "isolated" employer, which alters the application of Babcock.
In remote areas, such as in lumber camps or on board tankers,
nonemployees have expanded rights. It has been held that in such
situations, if solicitation off company property is impractical be-
cause of location, the employer must allow his premises to be used
for union organization under reasonable conditions."0 The second
special situation is that of the retail merchant. Because of the possi-
ble adverse effect that union solicitation could have on customers,
and thus on the employer's profit which insures his very existence,
union activity may be restricted in light of a justifiable business
purpose."1
Another circumstance that required later refinement was the
means used to disseminate information during the organizational
phase of union activity; oral solicitation and printed distributions
37. 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
38. Id. (companion case to Republic Aviation).
39. 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
40. See Sabine Towing & Transp. Co., 205 N.L.R.B. 423 (1973); Alaska Barite Co., 197
N.L.R.B. 1023 (1972); NLRB v. S. & H. Grossinger's Inc., 372 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1967); NLRB
v. Lake Superior Lumber Corp., 167 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1948). But cf. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424
U.S. 507 (1976) (constitutional protection of freedom of speech given by the first and four-
teenth amendments was available against private landowners only when their property as-
sumed all of the attributes of a municipality; the question of the scope of the statutory
protection under the NLRA was not reached; the Supreme Court, in applying this stricter
test, put greater emphasis on an employer's control of its private property albeit in the
context of picketing in this case).
41. See, e.g., Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 400 (1953); Marshall Field & Co. v.
NLRB, 200 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1952); Goldblatt Bros., 77 N.L.R.B. 1262 (1948); NLRB v. May
Dep't Stores Co., 154 F.2d 533 (8th Cir. 1946). But cf. May Dep't Stores Co., 136 N.L.R.B.
797 (1962); Bonwit Teller, Inc. v. NLRB, 197 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S.
905 (1953) (a retail employer may not use solicitation techniques denied its employees by its
privileged no-solicitation rule; for doing so, in May, the Board set aside an election and
ordered the regional director to conduct a new election so the employees could have a "free
choice" in deciding on union representation).
Retail restaurants have received separate but similar consideration, being allowed privi-
leged no-solicitation rules in areas where customers are likely to be. See, e.g., Marriott Corp.
(Children's Inn), 223 N.L.R.B. 978 (1976); McDonald's Corp., 205 N.L.R.B. 404 (1973).
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require different considerations. When written material is distrib-
uted, the purpose is satisfied as soon as it is received because it. is
in a durable form. Even though the union does not know if its
information will be read or accepted at the time, influence may be
possible later because of the relatively permanent nature of printed
matter; however, distribution requires infringement on the rights of
the property owner. In contrast, the effectiveness of oral solicitation
can be judged immediately through direct conversation and yet does
not infringe on the property rights of an employer. The Board has
ruled that with regard to oral solicitation "the right of employees
to solicit on plant premises must be afforded subject only to the
restriction that it be on nonworking time." 2 When the distribution
of literature is involved, however, employee access to nonworking
areas of the plant premises is all that is required.43 This distinction
recognizes that solicitation is less intrusive and thus is subject to
less restriction.
The Boundaries Within The Health-Care Field
From Peyton Packing in 1943 to the present the Board had devel-
oped slowly its solicitation philosophy with reference to the NLRA,
modifying precedent when necessary for the principle of accommo-
42. Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 615, 621 (1962). Solicitation and distribution
issues are significant because they often arise in the context of initial efforts to unionize an
employer and eventually have an effect on the result of the forthcoming election. In such an
election the union's goal is to show a majority for bargaining purposes. During this process,
ancillary issues of free speech and property rights are important. These issues are beyond the
scope of this paper; however, for background material on these considerations in general, see
Aaron, Employer Free Speech: The Search for a Policy, Punuc PoLICY AD Cou.EcrIVE
BARGARG (1962); R. Wmms, P. JANus, & K. HuHN, NLRB REGULATION OF ELECION
CONDUcr (1974); Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections
Under the National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARv. L. REV. 38 (1964); Christensen, Free
Speech, Propaganda and the National Labor Relations Act, 38 N.Y.U. L. REV. 243 (1963);
Daykin, Employees' Right to Organize on Company Time and Company Property, 42 ILL. L.
REV. 301 (1947); Getman, Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA and the Effort to Insulate Free
Employee Choice, 32 U. Cm. L. REV. 735 (1965); Getman & Goldberg, The Behavioral As-
sumptions Underlying NLRB Regulation of Campaign Misrepresentation: An Empirical
Evaluation, 28 STAN. L. REv. 263 (1976); Getman, Goldberg & Herman, NLRB Regulation of
Campaign Tactics: The Behavioral Assumptions on Which the Board Regulates, 27 STAN. L.
REV. 1465 (1975); Gould, The Question of Union Activity on Company Property, 18 VAND. L.
REv. 73 (1964); Vanderheyden, Employee Solicitation and Distribution-A Second Look, 14
LAB. L.J. 781 (1963); Note, Collectively Bargained Waiver of Plant-Site Solicitation and
Distribution, 56 IOWA L. REv. 152 (1970).
43. Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. at 621.
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dation. Recently, a different type of employer, the hospital-
employer, has come before the Board with increased frequency for
adjudication of its labor-solicitation disputes;" when the
"company" is a hospital, nursing home, or convalescent facility,
factors that have never been present previously in labor cases may
appear or, at least, become more significant.
A survey of the Board's few cases in the health-care field reveals
a checkered pattern of decisions.45 In Summit Nursing,46 the Board
held invalid a rule prohibiting solicitation by employees on hospital
property during nonworking hours in nonworking areas. The deci-
sion noted these significant facts: the hospital had allowed solicita-
tion in work areas for gifts for departing staff members; a worker
44. Hospitals for profit have always been covered by the NLRA; however, the NLRB, by
its ability to withhold as discretionary its jurisdiction in some matters, had declined to hear
such cases as being essentially local in character. By the latter part of 1960, the Board
recognized the growth of these institutions and-their effect on interstate commerce. It an-
nounced it would take jurisdiction over private proprietary hospitals in Butte Medical Proper-
ties, 168 N.L.R.B. 266 (1967), and over private proprietary nursing homes in University
Nursing Home, Inc., 168 N.L.R.B. 263 (1967).
Jurisdiction over nonprofit, health-care institutions came through a congressional amend-
ment in 1974. Act of July 26, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-360, § 1(a), 88 Stat. 295. Until this
enactment, such hospitals were specifically excluded from coverage under the NLRA. See
note 3 supra. See generally Carroll, Health Care Institution Coverage Under the National
Labor Relations Act, 38 Tax. B.J. 257 (1975); Vernon, Labor Relations In the Health Care
Field Under the 1974 Amendments To The National Labor Relations Act: An Overview and
Analysis, 70 NEv. U. L. Rav. 202 (1975).
These two events, the Boaid's broadening its jurisdiction and the Congress' widening
coverage of the NLRA, coming within seven years of each other after over thirty years of
NLRB nonintervention in the area, caused an epidemic of health care cases to emerge from
dormancy.
45. At the time Beth Israel was heard before the administrative law judge, the attorney
for the general counsel summarized the Board's solicitation policy to that date as follows:
(1) A rule forbidding distribution of union literature by employees in working
areas is presumptively valid even when applied to working and non-working
time.
(2) A rule forbidding distribution in non-working areas during non-working
time is presumptively invalid.
(3) A rule forbidding union solicitation by employees during their non-working
time, even though limited to working areas, is presumptively invalid.
(4) A rule forbidding union solicitation during working time in any plant area
is presumptively valid.
(5) A presumption of validity may be overcome if it can be shown that the rule
is discriminatory rather than attributable to the right of the employer to protect
his legitimate property interests.
223 N.L.R.B. at 1197. These accommodations had each been determined, however, in cases
outside of the health-care field.
46. Summit Nursing and Convalescent Home, 196 N.L.R.B. 769 (1972).
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who has sold dishes in work areas had not upset hospital operations;
and there was no evidence that the distribution in question had
caused a litter problem or in any other way interfered with the
efficiency of the institution.47
In Guyan Valley Hospital, Inc.,4" the Board addressed the issue
of solicitation in the work area. The hospital maintained a policy
which prohibited solicitation in work areas,. and the Board upheld
the policy. Although the entire extent of the areas lawfully subject
to the prohibition was never defined, the administrative law judge
included hallways, elevators, stairs, patients' rooms, and gift
shops."
In Bellaire General Hospital, Inc., 10 both solicitation and distribu-
tion were considered. The hospital had a rule forbidding solicitation
on nonworking time and distribution both on nonworking time and
in nonwork areas. The Board ordered the hospital to allow its em-
ployees "to engage in the distribution of union literature in nonwork
areas of its premises during nonworking time, and to engage in
union solicitation on its premises, during nonworking time. ' '5'
The most significant case that may affect the application of Beth
Israel, however, is St. John's Hospital.2 Language in St. John's
indicated that union activity was to be allowed throughout a wider
area of the hospital than should be presumed in Beth Israel. An
issue developed, therefore, regarding the area to which the Board's
order applied in Beth Israel. Although only the cafeteria and coffee
shop areas were the subject of the litigation before the Board and
the only areas mentioned by the order which the administrative law
judge issued and the Board initially approved, 53 confusion was
caused by a footnote the Board later added to the Decision and
Order written by the administrative law judge in Beth Israel. From
this point on, the "holding" of footnote two was significant in the
future development of the case:
Subsequent to the Administrative Law Judge's Decision in this
case, the Board in St. John's Hospital and School of Nursing,
47. Id. at 770.
48. 198 N.L.R.B. 107 (1972).
49. Id. at 111.
50. 203 N.L.R.B. 1105 (1973).
51. Id. at 1111.
52. St. John's Hosp. and School of Nursing, Inc., 222 N.L.R.B. 1150 (1976).
53. 223 N.L.R.B. at 1199.
750 [Vol. 20:741
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Inc., held that restrictions on solicitation and distribution in pa-
tient access areas such as cafeterias violates Sec. 8(a)(1) of the
Act. . . . [as did the] maintaining [of] an overly broad no-
solicitation, no-distribution rule that prohibited all solicitation
and distribution in all areas to which patients and visitors have
access and employees have access during nonworking time other
titan immediate patient care areas."4
The Board argued in the First Circuit that this added footnote re-
quired the court of appeals to enforce the order requiring rescission
of the rule to all areas other than immediate patient care areas, but
the court rejected this argument and emphasized that the Board's
order required rescission only to "that part of its [the hospital's]
written rule prohibiting distribution of union literature and union
solicitation in its cafeteria and coffee shop.""
When Beth Israel reached the Supreme Court, however, St.
John's was relied on heavily by the Court, even though the Tenth
Circuit" had refused to enforce the Board's order in St. John's,
which required the broad rescission over such a wide area.5" It will
be the final interpretation of St. John's "immediate patient care
area," or the clear rejection of that test altogether, that will give
meaning to boundaries set by cases subsequent to Beth Israel.
THE BouNDAlES SET By BEm ISRAEL
In deciding Beth Israel the NLRB, the court of appeals, and the
Supreme Court each paid deference to the peculiar situation pre-
sented by solicitation in a hospital. The attorney representing the
NLRB's general counsel before the administrative law judge argued
that striking the balance in this complaint "is made even more
complex by the rights of a third party, the rights of the patient. 58
The court of appeals was much more specific in recognizing that
there are considerations unique to hospital settings."
54. Id. at 1193 n.2 (citation omitted and emphasis supplied).
55. 554 F.2d at 482 (emphasis supplied). The coffee shop eventually became part of the
cafeteria at Beth Israel. 437 U.S. at 490.
56. 557 F.2d 1368 (10th Cir. 1977).:
57. 437 U.S. at 507.
58. 223 N.L.R.B. at 1196.
59. 554 F.2d at 481. This statement was in the context of a detailed caveat to the Board.
After the court acknowledged that the Board had decided the case correctly, as much of the
hospital's arguments were speculative, the opinion continued:
This is not to say that the Board does not bear a heavy continuing responsibility
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Notably, the Supreme Court also referred repeatedly to a hospi-
tal's special situation. First, the opinion quoted at length from St.
John's, a case the Court saw as comparable to Beth Israel; the Court
noted "that the primary function of a hospital is patient care and
that a tranquil atmosphere is essential to the carrying out of that
function. In order to provide this atmosphere, hospitals may be
justified in imposing somewhat more stringent prohibitions on solic-
itation than are generally permitted."" Moreover, the limited solici-
tation allowed by the hospital for drives such as the United Fund
perhaps could not be "equated with union solicitation in terms of
potential for generating controversy."'" The Court further recog-
nized the special nature of a hospital's situation by admitting "in
the context of health-care facilities, the importance of the em-
ployer's interest in protecting patients from disturbance cannot be
gainsaid"; this interest may demand the use of a "more finely cali-
brated scale"; and the case analogies to retail operations may be
"less than complete."62 Finally, the majority opinion concluded with
the strong caveat issued by the court of appeals concerning the
Board's continuing duty to review its policies in this particular area
of its jurisdiction.!3
At each decisional level the deference to the status of a hospital
to review its policies concerning organizational activities in various parts of
hospitals. Hospitals carry on a public function of the utmost seriousness and
importance. They give rise to unique considerations that do not apply in the
industrial settings with which the Board is more familiar. The Board should
stand ready to revise its rulings if future experience demonstrates that the well-
being of patients is in fact jeopardized.
Id. (emphasis supplied).
60. 437 U.S. at 495 (citing St. John's, 222 N.L.R.B. 1150 (1976)). The Court continued by
further quoting specific examples the Board set out in St. John's:
For example, a hospital may be warranted in prohibiting solicitation even on
non-working time in strictly patient care areas, such as the patients' rooms,
operating rooms, and places where patients receive treatment, such as x-ray and
therapy areas. Solicitation at any time in those areas might be unsettling to the
patients-particularly those who are seriously ill and thus need quiet and peace
of mind.
Id. (quoting St. John's) (emphasis supplied). This "strictly-patient-care-area" test had not
been stated by the Board, however, when the administrative law judge issued his decision
and order in Beth Israel.
61. Id. at 503. The Court made this observation with reference to the size of the cafeteria
being "sufficiently commodious to admit solicitation and distribution without disruption."
Id.
62. Id. at 505.
63. Id. at 508; see note 59 supra & accompanying text.
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in the labor-relations field was made clear; yet, at each level the
correct decision was reached only by accident-the accident of the
very peculiar Beth Israel facts. The opinions pay only parenthetical
respect to the burden of responsibility a hospital carries in such a
labor dispute; and furthermore, the primary rationale supporting
each holding came from the nonhealth-care field." No matter what
the attitude toward its employees' organizational activities is, neu-
tral or prohibitive, a hospital's first concern is the welfare of its
patients, and this is the rationale that should have bolstered the
holdings. If adequate patient care would not, or could not, be com-
promised, the solicitation holding in Beth Israel would be appropri-
ate; but the inquiry should be made only under a patient-care test,
rather than a factory-oriented, Republic Aviation test.15
Read broadly, Beth Israel could permit union organizational ac-
tivity over a wide range of hospital areas. The danger inherent in
the Beth Israel decision, then, is in the possible application of this
broader rule. Justice Blackmun in his concurring opinion expressed
"fear that this unusual case will be deemed to be an example...
and that the Board and the courts now will go further down the
open-solicitation road than they would have done, had a more usual
hospital case been the one first to come here."6 The scope of Beth
Israel as precedent thus depends upon the accuracy of Justice
Blackmun's apprehension. The boundaries of Beth Israel can be
analyzed by considering what facts were deemed significant and
what results were deemed inconsequential; such analysis will sug-
gest the probable impact of the case.
64. The Supreme Court's first citation was to Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S.
793 (1945), and this was followed immediately by a quotation from NLRB v. Babcock &
Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956), as recognizing the Board's authority to "accommodate"
employer-employee interests. 437 U.S. at 492. Both these cases involved an environment
completely foreign to a hospital setting; a manufacturing plant in Republic Aviation and a
hardware store's parking lot in Babcock, and, it may be argued, an environment impossibly
analogous, also. The BethIsrael opinion concludes with the "hands-off" directive of Universal
Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951):
Whether on the record as a whole there is substantive evidence to support
agency findings is a question which Congress has placed in the keeping of the
Courts of Appeals. This Court will intervene only in what ought to be the rare
instance when the standard appears to have been misapprehended or grossly
misapplied.
437 U.S. at 507 (citing Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 491).
65. 324 U.S. 793 (1945); see note 15 supra & accompanying text.
66. 437 U.S. at 509.
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Recognized But Unemphasized Facts
Beth Israel is a large, nationally known, nonprofit urban hospital
in Boston, Massachusetts. It employs approximately 2,200 regular
employees67 and provides over 1,190 lockers for employee use.68 The
hospital maintains a cafeteria for the benefit of its employees, pa-
tients, and the public." In 1970, prior to any union activity, Beth
Israel adopted a rule forbidding solicitation and distribution for any
reason in any areas except in a few specific locker rooms and adja-
cent rest rooms.70 In October, 1975, a medical technician distributed
a union newspaper in the careteria by approaching individuals
whom she thought were hospital employees, asking their status,
and, if they were employees, handing them a copy of the paper.7'
The technician received both an oral and a written warning that she
had violated the hospital's no-distribution rule and that continua-
tion of the activity would cause her dismissal.72
67. "Regular employee" does not include house staff, attending physicians, students, and
employees of Harvard University. Id. at 489 & n.6.
68. The lockers are scattered throughout the hospital in work and nonwork areas and are
divided on the basis of sex. Some are in secured areas. Only 613 lockers met the requirements
of the hospital's criteria for allowing solicitation and distribution. Id. at 489 & n.7.
69. A hospital survey showed the cafeteria was used by employees (77%), visitors (9%), and
patients (1.56%). Id. at 490.
70. The hospiial's rule read:
There is to be no soliciting of the general public (patients, vistors) on Hospital
property. Soliciting and the distribution of literature to B. I. employees may be
done by other B. I. employees, when neither individual is on his or her working
time, in employee-only areas-employee locker rooms and certain adjacent rest
rooms. Elsewhere within the Hospital including patient-care and all other work
areas, and areas open to the public such as lobbies, cafeteria and coffee shop,
corridors, elevators, gift shop, etc., there is to be no solicitation nor distribution
of literature.
Solicitation or distribution of literature on Hospital property by non-
employees is expressly prohibited at all times.
Consistent with our long-standing practices, the annual appeal campaigns of
the United Fund and of the Combined Jewish Philanthropies for voluntary
charitable gifts will continue to be carried out by the hospital.
Id. at 486-87. For eight months, from July, 1974, to March, 1975, the hospital had allowed
solicitation on a person-to-person basis in its cafeteria. This is the period when the Massachu-
setts Labor Relations Commission was hearing a charge filed by the union against the hospital
for its solicitation policy but before the NLRB had taken jurisdiction.
The organizational effort, solicitation, and distribution at Beth Israel were conducted by
the Boston Hospital Workers Organizing Committee, Massachusetts Hospital Workers Union
Local 880, Service Employees International Union, AFL-CIO. 223 N.L.R.B. at 1193-94.
71. 437 U.S. at 491. The content of the newsletter is discussed at note 102 infra & accompa-
nying text.
72. Id. at 491.
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The NLRB and the First Circuit Court of Appeals found the
hospital's rule to be in violation of the NLRA. Because of a conflict
among the circuits in similar cases, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari. 3 The narrow question to be decided was whether "the
Court of Appeals erred in enforcing the Board's order requiring peti-
tioner to rescind the rules as applied to the hospital's eating facili-
ties." 74 The Court held that the Board's general approach to the
question of solicitation in health-care facilities was "consistent with
the Act,"75 and, with reference to Beth Israel in particular, that the
Board was "appropriately sensitive to the importance of petitioner's
interest in maintaining a tranquil environment for patients."7
The most striking fact in the case was that the cafeteria was used
almost exclusively by employees. The Supreme Court characterized
it "more as an employee-service area than a patient-care area. ' 77
This fact alone was probably most decisive; yet, such an argument
can be made only by inference. For example, if employee use were
45%, rather than 77%, the effect this reduced percentage would have
on the decision is not clear; also unclear is what other factors might
have altered the outcome.
Consider a hypothetical hospital, City General. Suppose this hos-
pital's cafeteria is on the ground floor just off the main foyer, that
it efficiently serves adequately prepared food and, therefore, that it
is patronized by city shoppers and the local downtown work force,
as well as by the hospital's staff. Further suppose that City Gen-
eral's employees do not wear distinguishing name tags, many do not
wear uniforms, and many voluntary and auxiliary services are per-
73. Id. at 487-88. On the issue of the validity of restrictions upon solicitation and distribu-
tion in patient-access areas of the hospital, the circuits had divided thus: granting enforce-
ment of the Board's order allowing the solicitation and distribution-the First Circuit in
NLRB v. Beth Israel Hosp., 554 F.2d 477 (1st Cir. 1977), and the Seventh Circuit in Lutheran
Hosp. v. NLRB, 564 F.2d 208 (7th Cir. 1977); denying enforcement of the Board's order
allowing the solicitation and distribution-the Sixth Circuit in NLRB v. Baptist Hosp., Inc.,
576 F.2d 107 (6th Cir. 1978), the D. C. Circuit in Baylor Univ. Medical Center v. NLRB, 578
F.2d 351 (D.C. Cir. 1978), and the Tenth Circuit in St. John's Hosp. & School of Nursing,
Inc. v. NLRB, 557 F.2d 1368 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
74. 437 U.S. at 488-89.
75. Id. at 507. The approach to which the Court referred was "of requiring health-care
facilities to permit employee solicitation and distribution during nonworking time in non-
working areas, where the facility has not justified the prohibitions as necessary to avoid
disruption of health-care operations or disturbance of patients." Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 506. The Court also noted that the 1.56% patient use was of "critical signifi-
cance." Id. at 502.
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formed within the hospital.7 8 Also, the hospital has a school of nurs-
ing, and the students eat in the cafeteria. City General has very
liberal visiting hours and encourages families and friends to be with
the patients throughout the day. The hospital also encourages the
patients to be ambulatory and self-sufficient as quickly as possible,
in addition to having an entire wing devoted to "self-care," which
requires that these patients eat in the cafeteria for all meals. The
cafeteria in this hypothesized hospital is readily distinguishable
from the one at Beth Israel. What considerations a more typical
hospital cafeteria situation would reveal or how the court would
respond in a case involving a hospital situation falling in between
Beth Israel's cafeteria and the one just described cannot be inferred
from Beth Israel.
The peculiarities of Beth Israel's cafeteria were compounded fur-
ther by other physical factors of the hospital. There was no single
employee gathering area such as an adequate lounge or meeting
room. Instead, there were scattered locker rooms to which access
was restricted by sex and security precautions. Those available for
solicitation were small and inadequate for such purposes.79 More-
over, the location of the hospital itself in a metropolitan area made
contacting employees, other than on hospital property, difficult.
Finally, the large number of employees made the individual, off-
premises contacts, which are essential to effective union solicita-
tion, burdensome." These physical considerations-the cafeteria,
78. The issue of identity was important in Beth Israel because the few nonemployees who
usually would be in the cafeteria were easily identifiable as most Beth Israel employees were
required to wear name tags. 223 N.L.R.B. at 1196. Many employees in hospitals, moreover,
are not required to wear uniforms such as those employed in administration, personnel,
business, insurance, or accounting offices, nor are smaller departments with positions such
as computer programming, public relations, cashiers, receptionists, maintenance, or tele-
phone operators. With these employees it would be difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish
them from many self-sufficient inpatients, family members of patients, outpatients, visitors,
and the general public who may be in the cafeteria.
79. Some of the locker areas were so small that employees "could not receive literature
there unless one of their members would distribute or solicit. . . . There [was] no bulletin
board in one large female locker room." Id. at 1197.
80. That many doors were available for entrance or exit, that the employees could come
and go without reaching public property for some distance, and that the employees lived in
widely scattered areas made the cafeteria one of the few, if only, appropriate area for solicita-
tion. See id. at 1197. Although Babcock established that consideration of alternative means
of communication was not always a necessary inquiry in deciding a union's organizational
solicitation rights, 351 U.S. at 112-13, the Supreme Court in Beth Israel, recognizing this rule
"outside of the health-care context," stated "it may be that the importance of the employer's
interest here demands use of a more finely calibrated scale." 437 U.S. at 505.
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the locker rooms, the size and location of the hospital, and the size
of the staff-were all mentioned in the opinion, but their relative
weights, if any, on the holding were never clarified.
Besides the physical distinctions from a typical hospital that can
be drawn, other less tangible, but equally powerful, arguments exist
which indicate the uniqueness of Beth Israel. First, the hospital
itself used the areas forbidden to the union for its own solicitation
needs."' Second, when confronted with a prior situation in the cafe-
teria that could have been detrimental to a patient's mental health,
the hospital reacted with a general directive for discretion, not by
an all-inclusive ban on the offensive behavior." In effect, then, the
hospital put itself into an estoppel position with each of these ac-
tions. Also, there existed the intangible of possible antiunion ani-
mus. This feeling was shown in a special hospital newspaper, which
stated that union activities were disruptive and that unions had no
concern for their own members.83 Such feeling could be inferred
additionally from the refusal of the hospital to give the union a list
of employees and their addresses unless ordered to do so by the
NLRB. 84
Behavior that would give rise to an estoppel argument or to an
inference of hostility to union activity has been significant in other
cases in which the relation between employer and employee rights
is critical. This behavior will support an inference of lack of good
faith and tip the balance in favor of allowing the employees' activi-
81. The hospital used the cafeteria to publicize a cost reduction effort, the credit union,
travel opportunities, car pool information, nutritional ideas, tennis camps, film processing,
magazine subscriptions, insurance applications, and United Fund and Combined Jewish
Philanthropies Fund drives. 223 N.L.R.B. at 1196. The Supreme Court noted that the cafe-
teria had been used for "solicitation and distribution to employees for purposes other than
union activity." 437 U.S. at 490.
82. Members of the professional staff had discussed the condition of various patients, by
name, in the cafeteria, and complaints were made to the hospital by other patients and
visitors. While admitting that the effect of such conversation could be "devastating," the
hospital simply warned its staff to make sure only the appropriate audience heard such
conversations. Id. at 502 n.20.
83. The statements were made by the hospital's general director in a paper dated January
16, 1973. The paper stated that a union "has no place at Beth Israel Hospital," that the
"disruptive activities of the union organizers demonstrate their lack of true concern for both
B. I. patients and employees," and that "the Union's primary concern today is [with]...
dues." 223 N.L.R.B. at 1198. The Supreme Court alluded to these hospital statements, also.
437 U.S. at 491.
84. 437 U.S. at 491.
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ties.s5 If this balancing process were used in Beth Israel, it was not
identified as such in any of the three opinions; yet, it may have been
crucial.
Along with the unique physical situation of the hospital and the
intangible, inferential characteristics present, behavior of the liti-
gants affected their case; the hospital argued its case poorly, and the
union acted impeccably. The basic thrust of the hospital's argument
was to attack the Board as having ignored congressional policy, as
having exceeded its area of expertise, and as having made its deci-
sion irrationally without sufficient evidence.8 Repeatedly, the
courts referred to the poor quality of the hospital-petitioner's con-
tentions. The court of appeals characterized the hospital's argument
concerning possible patient anxiety as "unduly speculative."' The
majority opinion of the Supreme Court noted that the record before
the Board was devoid of any evidence that would contradict the
Board's decisionn and further commented on the lack of presenta-
tion of evidence by the hospital, which was in a most favorable
position to provide it." Even the concurring opinion of Justice Pow-
ell, which was especially sensitive to the hospital's position, noted
the general nature of its arguments." If the hospital had been more
diligent in supporting its legitimate concern for patient anxiety dur-
ing a union organizational period with objective data and substan-
85. In NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963), an employer changed his seniority
rules extending a 20 year seniority credit to working employees while some of his other
employees were on strike. The Supreme Court ruled that proof of an antiunion motivation,
by specific evidence or by inferences drawn from employer conduct, may make unlawful
certain employer conduct which would in other circumstances be lawful. Even if all things
are essentially equal then, which they were not in Beth Israel, an employer's motivation,
which can be inferred from his conduct, can be the decisive element.
86. 437 U.S. at 498-501.
87. 554 F.2d at 481.
88. 437 U.S. at 495.
89. Id. at 502.
Eipecially telling is the fact that petitioner, under compulsion of the Massachu-
setts Labor Commission, permitted limited union solicitation in the cafeteria for
a significant period, apparently without untoward effects, and that petitioner,
who logically is in the best position to offer evidence on point, was unable to
introduce any evidence to show that solicitation or distribution was or would be
harmful.
Id.
90. "[The hospital] relied primarily on arguments with respect to hospitals in general.
A further weakness in petitioner's case is that it introduced no medical testimony that
related such practices and needs to its cafeteria." Id. at 517.
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tial proof, such criticism could not have been made." Also, the
hospital's strongest argument, that determination of a patient's
well-being is one for a medical doctor to make, should have been
presented more forcefully and without a direct attack on the Board's
expertise. Surely much voluntary testimony by doctors on this issue
would have been available to the hospital.
In contrast to the inadequate presentation made by the petitioner
is the excellent presentation by the union of its evidence and of its
exemplary behavior throughout the organizational campaign. Only
one individual was involved in the cafeteria distribution, a lab tech-
nician employed by the hospital for over one year. She asked each
potential distributee whether he was an employee when not sure of
his status and personally handed the literature to him, rather than
leaving it at several locations while circulating among employees.
She did not discuss the literature, and, when asked by nonemploy-
ees, she said she was distributing information for hospital workers.
Finally, she reacted calmly and rationally to her oral and written
rebukes.2 The unique circumstances that were present and the pos-
sible arguments that could be inferred, coupled with the experience
of the union regarding conduct during initial campaigns, were no
match for Beth Israel's weak attempt to argue patient-care responsi-
bilities. Although these facts were before each decision-making
body, they were only catalogued rather than given the significant
emphasis they deserved.
Ignored or Misinterpreted Effects
That specific facts were not distinguished consistently at any de-
cisional level may indicate that other critical factors will go unre-
fined in the special circumstances presented by health-care labor
disputes. Effects that were not interpreted adequately, but that
should have been refined in Beth Israel include the effect of allowing
solicitation only, the effect of applying a precise definition of
patient-care area, the effect of rejecting a property or economic
91. Counsel before the administrative law judge called the petitioner's concern "a sham."
223 N.L.R.B. at 1198.
Some proof certainly would have been available if the hospital had used the eight months
in which its solicitation ban was lifted to gather data methodically on the issue. Some data
was already available that patients became disturbed when Viet Nam sentiments were dem-
onstrated in the cafeterias during those years of conflict. See id. at 1194.
92. Id. at 1195-96.
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based rationale, and the effect of paying more respect to a totally
new area of labor law.
First, the distinction between oral solicitation and distribution of
printed matter could be vital for a concerned hospital. Solicitation
leaves no "residue"; there is nothing in print to be left for an unin-
tended audience to stumble upon, allowing reevaluation by an unin-
formed participant. The chance of an emotional discussion or pro-
vocation leading to something more serious is greater, however, be-
cause the contact made concerning the union is uniquely personal
and on a one-to-one basis. If the person approached has just as
strong and as vocal antiunion sentiments as the union solicitor has
prounion feelings, then the potential for a verbal explosion and esca-
lating confrontation is present." Conversely, distribution of printed
union literature occurs in a less direct manner, and the location can
be more effectively controlled because the employer may limit such
activity to an employee parking lot, an adequate lounge, or the
time-clock area. The problem with distributed material, though, is
that it often contains critical comments about the employer, and,
if a union flyer is left on hospital property, it may be read by one
not involved in the heat of the labor dispute-one without an oppor-
tunity to see the full range of charges and countercharges and thus
unable to put the statements into proper perspective or to evaluate
possible exaggeration. In this situation, the hospital's concern over
''patient anxiety" is not just "speculative."
The court of appeals, in rejecting this very argument by the hospi-
tal, also rejected the inference that union solicitors may behave
irresponsibly. 4 Rejection of this inference ingores that what is nor-
mal in day-to-day coversations is not the norm in a typical union
organizational campaign. Although the courts have recognized this
distinction, they have approved more extreme behavior on the part
of the union than is normally allowed either because of the strong
feeling for labor's rights in organizational efforts, as provided for in
the NLRA, or because of simple necessity. 5 The law must take into
93. This possibility has been recognized often by decision makers. See, e.g., McDonald's
Corp., 205 N.L.R.B. 404 (solicitation might lead to the exchange of insults or worse).
94. 554 F.2d at 481.
95. See, e.g., Hollywood Ceramics Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 221 (1962). This case involved state-
ments made during an election campaign, which is usually the next phase in union activity
after the organizational effort but very similar to it. The Supreme Court has further author-
ized the Board's approach in allowing wide latitude in behavior and in recognizing "repulsive
speech enjoys immunity provided it falls short of a deliberate or reckless untruth." Linn v.
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account, then, that "absolute precision of statement and complete
honesty are not always attainable. . ., nor are they expected by the
employees."9 What a court has come to see as normal, responsible
behavior, given the circumstances, may not be what a hospital can
tolerate.
Whether both solicitation and distribution are allowed, then, may
make a significant difference to a hospital. If a court will use the
"more finely calibrated scale" suggested by the majority in Beth
Israel as necessary in the health-care field97 and accommodate
employer-employee rights with a more restrictive rule than Beth
Israel details, then the concern of a hospital for its patients can be
more easily alleviated. If the hospital could argue successfully for
solicitation only and restrict the allowance of this activity by strict
disciplinary rules for any disruptive behavior, the employer, the
employee, and the patient should all benefit. This effect was over-
looked by the Court, however, because, by treating solicitation and
distribution identically, the best interests of the patient were not
compared in each situation.
A second misconception by the Court concerns the effect of the
interpretation of what constitutes a patient-care area. A hospital is
a total environment, a place in which patients and their visitors and
families should have freedom to move. A patient's room should not
be his cell. In recognition of this possible confinement a hospital
often provides areas for a coffee shop, a gift shop, a florist, a chapel,
a library, vending machines, hair salons, and waiting-visting
lounges. This type of an environment does not lend itself, as does a
commercial store or an industrial plant, to a division into work and
nonwork areas; a hospital is always "at work" where the mental and
physical health of a patient is concerned. Hospitals serve patients
and relatives who "are under emotional strain and worry . . .
United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53, 63 (1966). The defamation test is the strict stan-
dard of actual malice as defined in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
See National Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974).
96. 140 N.L.R.B. at 223.
97. 437 U.S. at 505. This concept was elaborated in Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
"The locus of [that] accommodation [between the legitimate interests of both employer and
employee] may fall at differing points along the spectrum depending on the nature and
strength of the respective § 7 rights and private property rights asserted in any given context."
Id. at 522. The degree of calibration should depend on the nature of the employer's business.
98. That a hospital's environment should not be so divided was noted in both concurring
opinions. 437 U.S. at 508, 513.
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[andI-irrespective of whether that patient and that family are
labor or management oriented-need a . . . helpful atmosphere,
rather than one remindful of the tensions of the marketplace in
addition to the tensions of the sick bed."9 This respect for the
emotional well-being of the patient, his family, and other visitors
must extend throughout the hospital to be meaningful.
Another significant factor overlooked completely was that
"emotional well-being" is neither a consideration of percentages nor
an argument of economics. Human injury, not profit loss, is in-
volved. Justice Blackmun refers to the irony that the sensitivities
of Hot Shoppe cafeteria patrons receive more deference than do
those of the patients of Beth Israel.110 That only 1.56% of the cafe-
teria's patrons are patients is not significant. If one patient suffers
emotional harm from one incident of irresponsible union activity or
from one unreliable union report of "facts," a restrictive
solicitation-distribution ban is justified. The decisions not only
looked at the wrong balance sheet (employer v. employee, rather
than employer and employee v. patient), but also used incorrect
accounting principles (economic rather than personal) in accommo-
dating the interest.
What will and will not upset patients in general, and to what
extent, is outside Board expertise. This decision, if one has to be
made, is ultimately one for doctors to make. Just as a court will not
substitute its opinions for the business judgment of a board of direc-
tors of a corporation, neither should a court make such a medical
determination. By failing to recognize that a hospital cannot be
divided simply into patient and nonpatient-care areas and by fur-
ther analyzing the problem as one of percentages, the Court in Beth
Israel failed to realize the gravity of the possible effect, an effect on
an already troubled person, not on an economic, managerial inter-
est.
An extension of this argument regarding the special circumstan-
ces present in the health-care field, which was also misinterpreted
by the Court, concerns the very nature of a hospital itself. In its
most general aspects, a hospital is an institution established for the
control of disease and for the relief of the sick, which makes a hospi-
tal, whether proprietary or nonproprietary, a charitable institution.
It promotes the general good, the patients' welfare; needs of third
99. Id. at 509 (concurring opinion).
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parties are the hospital's whole reason for existence. In this respect,
what is a "managerial" interest takes on a different connotation,
that of the patients' well-being. The Court dealt with the principle
of accommodation, but accommodation of a property interest only.
Although the opinion voiced concern for the welfare of patients and
stated that this was a particularly "weighty" managerial interest,,,,
its final analysis was based on the extent of the employer interest
in controlling his property at the expense of the employee interest
in union organization. Therefore, in dealing with the principle of
accommodation between the employer-employees and with the con-
cern for the patients' welfare in the hospital setting, the Court in
Beth Israel focused only on the property interest of the employer.
This property rationale has no relevance to a charitable-purpose
institution. Any analogy to rules in an industrial or commercial
setting fails because the difference is one in kind. What might hap-
pen within a hospital is, in itself, significant, and not defectively
speculative.
Counsel for the hospital, in his brief, lists "a sampling of the
content of the union monthly leaflet," including, among other
things, a complaint that there was so little linen that patients had
to do without, allegations that the chest physical therapy depart-
ment was understaffed during Sundays and evenings, that pa-
tients went without adequate nursing care for several months
early in 1974, an article in the July edition alleging that an em-
ployee claimed she was totally ignored during her stay at the
hospital as a patient giving birth, an item in the September issue
commenting favorably upon an employee work stoppage in the
main kitchen which included an inquiry as to whether the hospi-
tal administration really cared about patients and, if so, why
were not good signs provided to direct patients out of the hospital
and containing also the statement that "when weekend comes as
far as dietary bosses are concerned, the patients can go to hell.' ' 2
Decision-making bodies often must draw inferences. The Court eas-
ily could have inferred the impact of such seemingly authoritative
100. Id. at 508 (concurring opinion).
101. Id. at 492 (concurring opinion).
102. 223 N.L.R.B. at 1196. The statements were not commented upon by the administra-
tive law judge; they were merely reported in a separate paragraph under "Discussion and
Conclusions." They were never mentioned specifically by either the court of appeals or by
the Supreme Court.
19791
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
printed statements, critical of the hospital, on the emotions of a sick
patient and his anxious friends and relatives. A patient is an espe-
cially vulnerable person; it is unlikely that he can be objective or
rational, or that he should have to be, about statements attacking
the environment upon which his life depends. Furthermore, to say
that a particularly sensitive patient can avoid "the situation" by
staying in his room' 3 ignores the purpose of a hospital as well as the
effect of such confinement on a patient. When statements cause
harm to patients, discipline of the employees responsible is not an
adequate remedy. Health considerations make prevention of the
harm in the first instance critical. 04
Solicitation-distribution issues bring into focus differing levels of
concern that exist for every hospital. It is clear what a hospital
should accomplish: maintaining minimum standards of patient
care. What it wishes to do may surpass these minimum require-
ments. For instance, a hospital may consider the majority of its
employees as professionals and expect inhouse disputes to be kept
completely within a professional realm of conduct. A liberal
solicitation-distribution policy makes this unlikely. Also, what a
hospital must do should be kept in mind; it has legal responsibilities
to its patients while they are under its care. A hospital can be held
liable for negligence; it is not immune from a patient's suit in tort
for emotional harm. A liberal soliciation-distribution policy makes
such litigation a constant concern.
Finally, the effect of the Board's quickness to apply precedent and
the courts' acquiescence in that approach have not been fully real-
ized. Hospital solicitation is a new area for the Board, and it should
have considered carefully whether a need existed for new distinc-
tions not required in other fields. One possible result of the Board's
decision was best expressed by Justice Blackmun when he admitted
103. 437 U.S. at 502.
104. The court of appeals pointed out the "discipline" remedy: "[ilf. .. employee organ-
izers deliberately distribute 'scurrilous' literature to patients or visitors, the hospital may well
have cause to discipline such employees." 554 F.2d at 481 (citing as authority for this ap-
proach NLRB v. Local 1229, IBEW, 346 U.S. 464 (1953)). The "discipline" in that case was
"firing". Such a solution ignores the facts that the harm has already been done, that the
hospital may not want to dismiss a valuable employee, that what is "scurrilous" and what is
"deliberate" behavior must be determined, and that this is a subjective inquiry. See note 97
supra & accompanying text for a discussion of the acceptance of this approach coupled with
a narrow solicitation-only rule, in preference to a broad, Beth Israel solicitation-distribution
allowance.
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that the courts could now take health-care facilities "further down
the open-solicitation road" on the authority of Beth Israel. "5 When
the Board was first faced with problems of union elections, preemp-
tion, or retail merchants' work areas, it went slowly, making narrow
holdings, identifying their scope, and establishing precedent over
time."6 Board expertise in labor relations could cause a blindness
to other, equally significant, nonlabor-relations facts, which makes
a "go slow" approach necessary when initial decisions are made in
any new area. Such a "go slow" approach should have been followed
in regard to labor disputes in the health-care field.
The ironic result of each of these effects being ignored or misinter-
preted by the Board and the courts is that the buttressing rationale
for all labor law decisions-that the purpose of the act or the pur-
pose of the amendment be effectuated-is frustrated. The Supreme
Court gave the purpose of the 1974 Health Care Amendments"' as
a basis for the Beth Israel decision; but by affirming the Board's
decision, the Court thwarted what the amendments were trying to
accomplish: the extension of protection of the NLRA to nonprofit
hospitals so that union organization there could be nondisruptive.15
B= ISRAEL: AFTERTHOUGHTS
Because of the peculiar facts, the behavior of the participants,
and the presentation of the case, the holding of Beth Israel could
not have been otherwise unless each decision-making body had
stepped outside of its role as the neutral enforcer of federal labor law
policy and adopted the role of an advocate for the employer. The
same decision, however, could have been cast in different language
and supported by a more appropriate rationale. Alternatively, the
Court could have given no explanation at all, which is what it has
done in the past when confronted with a correct decision inappro-
105. 437 U.S. at 509 (concurring opinion).
106. Election precedent was built up in cases as NLRB v. Tower Co., 329 U.S. 324 (1946);
General Elec. Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 364 (1953); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 453
(1962); and Bekins Moving & Storage Co., 211 N.L.R.B. 138 (1974).
Preemption precedent includes Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); San Diego Bldg.
Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959); Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers Local
114, 383 U.S. 53 (1966); and Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
For precedent in the area of retail merchandising, see note 41 supra & accompanying text.
107. 437 U.S. at 496-97.
108. See, e.g., Pointer, 1974 Health Care Amendments to the National Labor Relations
Act, 26 Ls. L. J. 350 (1975).
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priately reached. In such cases the Court has, in effect, authored a
"concurring opinion" to the previous decision by stating, for exam-
ple, "[w]e affirm the judgment below, but, with respect to [a
certain] question . . . . [we affirm] on grounds which may differ
from those of the Court of Appeals." ' 9 This should have been the
approach taken by the Supreme Court in Beth Israel, rather than
leaving intact the inappropriate rationale of the case.
If the Court later objects to the path that subsequent hospital-
solicitation cases are taking following the precedent of Beth Israel,
it can note distinguishing facts or reverse itself. If simply noting
distinguishing facts is deemed insufficient,110 the Court can model
its decision on the technically perfect "reversal opinion" written by
Justice Brennan in.Boys Market."' Had Justice Brennan's opinion
in Beth Israel been this lucid when that case was before the Court,
he could have avoided having the Court "decide the case twice," as
it inevitably will have to.
One commentator at a labor law convention held shortly after
Beth Israel was decided described the Court as "uneasy with its
decision."'1 For this reason, the Supreme Court built an element of
109. See, e.g., language from John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 544
(1964) (defining successor-employer's duty to arbitrate under the collective bargaining agree-
ment between the original employer and the union).
110. For example, the importance of distinguishing facts was noted in NLRB v. Burns Int'l
Security Serv., 406 U.S. 272, 274 (1972) (successor-employer's duty to bargain based on the
two specific facts that it had voluntarily inherited a bargaining unit that was largely intact
and one that had been certified within the past year; these facts were identified, discussed
as relevant, and then singled out as being clearly the basis for the holding).
111. Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235 (1970), rev'g Sinclair Refining
Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962) (holding that the Norris-LaGuardia Act does not bar a
federal district court from issuing injunctive relief against a strike called in violation of an
arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agreement). The opinion begins with a definite
statement of what has been wrong with the decision it is now overruling, proceeds with why
and how the problems developed, concludes with a holding spelling out what it is saying,
"[o]ur holding . . . is narrow," and what it is not, "[nior does it follow from what we have
said that . . . " and gives concrete examples, "the following principles [are forl the guid-
ance of the district courts." 398 U.S. at 253-54 (Justice Brennan was the author of both the
Boys Markets and the Beth Israel decisions).
112. Address by Stephen S. Rappoport, Eighth Annual Labor Law Conference of the Vir-
ginia Bar Association (October 9, 1978). Mr. Rappoport is an editor of the Labor Relations
Reporter, Bureau of National Affairs, in Washington, D. C.. He spoke at the conference held
in Virginia Beach, Virginia, giving an analysis of the Supreme Court's 1978 labor law deci-
sions. Beth Israel was the lead case of his address, and his initial comment on the case was
that one could not "see the law through the facts." He concluded his cogent examination
with, "While the Court's decision endorses the Board's Republic Aviation approach, that is
about all one can say in terms of the law-until the Court decides the next hospital case."
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flexibility into its opinion: it repeated the "continuing-
responsibility" warning the court of appeals directed to the Board;
it cited Universal Camera's test for court intervention, which is only
for "gross misapplication" of standards; and it concluded with a
reference to two recent cases in which the Supreme Court again
recognized "the authority of the Board to modify its construction of
the Act in light of its cumulative experience.""'
Moreover, the Board itself, with time, should become more sensi-
tive to hospitals' special problems as its decisions grow from the
infancy of its recently acquired jurisdiction."' Likewise, hospitals
will become more sophisticated in the techniques of dealing with
unions and more adept at arguing administrative law cases before
a national board. Accordingly, the rationale of Beth Israel will have
to be modified, clarified, or distinguished, as deemed necessary
under the changing circumstances.
CONCLUSION
The boundaries set by Beth Israel for health-care, solicitation-
distribution precedent rested on unemphasized facts and their mis-
interpreted results. The impact of Beth Israel is thus unclear; it will
depend upon whether the flaws in this decision are rectified. One is
reminded of the law school maxim, "easy cases make bad law," as
this unique case may have made "bad law." The Court might have
been more successful with a difficult case. Beth Israel presented a
combination of circumstances whose cumulative effect could not
have supported a different result. This was so obvious, so "easy,"
that the numerous distinctions and many special facts, when not
emphasized or, worse, when misinterpreted, produced "bad law" or,
equally serious, the possibility for bad application of "good law."
The Court failed to see the significance of Beth Israel when decid-
ing the case. The solution will have to come in a subsequent
hospital-solicitation case in which the Court can make clear how
unique Beth Israel was. Although Beth Israel does lend itself to a
distinction based on the precise facts involved and easily can be
distinguished from a more typical hospital-solicitation case, the
concern is that it will not be so distinguished. Meanwhile, Beth
Israel stands "As We See It."
F.H.R.
113. 437 U.S. at 508.
114. See note 3 supra & accompanying text.
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